Some thoughts on Bazball
Posted: Mon Jul 03, 2023 1:56 pm
In the late 1980s, Mike Tyson at the very peak of his powers met Muhammed Ali on a talk show host, and both were inevitably asked who would win a hypothetical fight between the two, should it of ever happened. The shy, star-struck Tyson respectfully said that Ali was the greatest fighter ever, and he would be no match for him; Ali responded by saying "yeah, but if this guy caught me"... before comically falling in his chair pretending to be dead.
While it was good natured mutual respect, both gave fairly accurate assessments If the two ever fought, their range of styles would have almost certainly dictated that Ali's speed, movement, combinations, longer reach and superior technique would provide for a much more objectively optimal style for winning at the elite level of the sport. Tyson, the smaller man with only superior power over his opponent, would be reduce to hanging in for as long as possible, and try to land the nuclear payload contained in his right fist with enough of his peak force to put Ali's lights out. Every boxer has a punchers chance....
People view sporting strategy almost uniquely in the prism of objectivity; that there is some secret sauce available to everyone that means one can win. The truth is, optimal strategies are based on what is available, be that skills, personnel, physical capacity or some other variable. In our hypothetical boxing match, should Tyson have tried to defend Ali, and out jab him to wear him down, he would have been mauled - even if in most cases such a style would be objectively the best available. An objectively sub-optimal solution is often optimal dependent on circumstances. Tyson's only chance of winning would be to swing like someone after 12 pints of ale, and hope one or two stuck right on the chin.
People seem to have forgotten quickly that England's batters faced a similar conundrum in recent years. Faced with good, tight test match bowling, our batters techniques have not stood up to the job. Batsman following the process of normal test match strategy were unable to survive because their techniques were not of a required standard to live up to constantly defending. Someone like Crawley is a perfect example - he will frequency offer a false shot outside of his off-stump on certain levels of bowling, so attempting to bat out 100 balls and make a platform is somewhat lost on him. With such a short shelf life, what is the point of playing to your weaknesses?
I dont think that Bazball was ever intended to be a catch all generic blueprint for test match success, merely a blueprint for getting the best out whatever tools were available. Test match teams that have batters with robust techniques maybe aren't ticking time bombs that are always a handful of overs away from their next false shot defending their wicket. Take Usman Khawaja.... he has shown he can bat for 150-250-350 balls regularly opening the batting, so there is no need for him to cash in on his available time, as his technique buys enough time. The same cannot be said of Crawley, who left to defending his wicket, has proven he will always be a few overs from pushing his bat outside the offstump and knicking off. If you are always 50 balls away from an edge, may as well find out how many runs you can score before that happens, then simply bunker in for 10 and then get out.
In this way, Bazball has been very effective. Since Mccullum took over, the average England batter has averaged between 49-50 balls per dismissal. In comparison, between 2015-May 2022, England's batters lasted 57 balls on average. So while the extra aggression means English batters last shorter innings, it is more than made up by the fact that England score a lot more (4.77 an over in comparison to 3.1) with the balls available. The net effect has been a dramatic increase in batter averages, from 30 runs per wicket to a decimal under 40. This figure in itself is high in comparison to recent, and distance, test match wicket averages.
Taking this a little further, general test match stats say that a batsman gets out to roughly every 11 false shots. Since Bazball was implemented, England's false shot ratio is 1 x 4,5 balls. Which puts it about perfect on the general test ratio. While England make more frequent false shots using bazball, they still get away with an average amount of false shots per wicket. Which further provides evidential proof that the approach of cashing in while you can is statistically sound. To note, the England false shot ratio is higher in this Ashes (5.0 balls per shot), and not too distinct from Australia's (6.1 balls), despite the gulf in scoring rates. In fact, one could argue based on these statistics, its a noticeable drop in false shots produced by England's bowlers which really stands out this series (across Bazball era, its been 5.0 generally, which also includes the flat pitches of Pakistan which were much, much higher). There is an interesting case then that while false shot ratios are a little higher, and England's batters bat less balls, the scoring rate pays off on both accounts for an extra 100 runs per innings.
Of course, we will never know whether this approach is a consequence of improving one team over a generically good tactic that works for all teams, until a better base batting side attempts it. For instance, would Steve Smith increasing his RR at the cost of innings length work? We simply don't know until someone does it, so we have some data. But if false shots show anything, it does seem to indicate a statistical pay off in general in the data for England.
The only problem with this optimalisation of approach for England is, playing always "optimally" can in itself become somewhat of a negative. In the game of poker for instance, game theorists nowadays posit that playing the "perfect" mathematical strategy for success is counter intuitive, because it becomes predictable, and your opponent will adapt their own behaviour and strategies to counter it. In this case, if you only bet on hands where you are always mathematically likely to win, your opponent will not engage, or can read your play easily, rendering the strategy null and easy to exploit/counter. The "perfect" strategy is therefore one that is dependant on being inefficient or counter-productive a certain percentage of the time. This ensures that your opponent reacts to your imperfections, and sets them up to be exploited by your primary strategy.
In this way, we can see the failures of the bazball style. Australia have reacted to England's optimal strategy by defending solely for that, and giving other opportunities to exploit - one's that England have declined to take in their pursuit of their primary goals. In the last test, had England adapted their style back to one that is defensive, one that has generally been "imperfect" for them, it would have still nevertheless have been a sound idea. When the fielding team puts 4 men on the boundary and bowls in areas where you can only score by taking on those fielders, the element of risk is very high. The ability to adapt to less optimal strategies does, however, mean that switching your play back can exploit the reactions in the field. If England had defended and looked for singles, the Australian captain would start to bring the field in to save the bleeding runs, and at that point the primary strategy to target big hitting once again becomes useful.
In fact, at this point, England have Australia in a position of slight fear of Bazball. Cummins has set his fields abnormally defensively even with the new ball, which in turn sets England for easy runs if they have them, and leaves less catchers for the error. The ability to resort to Bazball at any stage plays on the psyche of the opponents, and is in itself a very powerful tool tactically. If they played to the situation more, they then also boost the likelihood that their primary tactics work. After 10-20 overs of nicking singles from a field spread on the boundary, any captain has to either react, or let the opposition have easy runs. At the point England have won a mini-battle, and should realise that. Any situation they find the opponent with 7 men on the boundary and singles for free on offer, is surely a situation they would accept happily? The main problem is, England haven't taken those opportunities with any length of time.
The Australian reaction is in many ways a tactical blunder, but one that has worked because England have been dogmatic in their pursuit of their playing style. Common sense says, if they deviate from it and adapt, they could have teams on the run. Imagine a scenario as captain where you bring the field up and get smashed, put it back and a team just knocks you for 4 singles an over into gaps? England have the ability to do the former, and should have the ability to do the later.
I would like to think Bazball is a work in progress, and that these errors will eventually be straightened out, with England finding further improvements in efficiency. In many ways, losing 2 tests might be useful in the long run in achieving that aim. There has been a slight god complex about England in their recent era of success, and a feeling of invincibility in the way they play. But the plan could work even better if they try to perfect it.
While it was good natured mutual respect, both gave fairly accurate assessments If the two ever fought, their range of styles would have almost certainly dictated that Ali's speed, movement, combinations, longer reach and superior technique would provide for a much more objectively optimal style for winning at the elite level of the sport. Tyson, the smaller man with only superior power over his opponent, would be reduce to hanging in for as long as possible, and try to land the nuclear payload contained in his right fist with enough of his peak force to put Ali's lights out. Every boxer has a punchers chance....
People view sporting strategy almost uniquely in the prism of objectivity; that there is some secret sauce available to everyone that means one can win. The truth is, optimal strategies are based on what is available, be that skills, personnel, physical capacity or some other variable. In our hypothetical boxing match, should Tyson have tried to defend Ali, and out jab him to wear him down, he would have been mauled - even if in most cases such a style would be objectively the best available. An objectively sub-optimal solution is often optimal dependent on circumstances. Tyson's only chance of winning would be to swing like someone after 12 pints of ale, and hope one or two stuck right on the chin.
People seem to have forgotten quickly that England's batters faced a similar conundrum in recent years. Faced with good, tight test match bowling, our batters techniques have not stood up to the job. Batsman following the process of normal test match strategy were unable to survive because their techniques were not of a required standard to live up to constantly defending. Someone like Crawley is a perfect example - he will frequency offer a false shot outside of his off-stump on certain levels of bowling, so attempting to bat out 100 balls and make a platform is somewhat lost on him. With such a short shelf life, what is the point of playing to your weaknesses?
I dont think that Bazball was ever intended to be a catch all generic blueprint for test match success, merely a blueprint for getting the best out whatever tools were available. Test match teams that have batters with robust techniques maybe aren't ticking time bombs that are always a handful of overs away from their next false shot defending their wicket. Take Usman Khawaja.... he has shown he can bat for 150-250-350 balls regularly opening the batting, so there is no need for him to cash in on his available time, as his technique buys enough time. The same cannot be said of Crawley, who left to defending his wicket, has proven he will always be a few overs from pushing his bat outside the offstump and knicking off. If you are always 50 balls away from an edge, may as well find out how many runs you can score before that happens, then simply bunker in for 10 and then get out.
In this way, Bazball has been very effective. Since Mccullum took over, the average England batter has averaged between 49-50 balls per dismissal. In comparison, between 2015-May 2022, England's batters lasted 57 balls on average. So while the extra aggression means English batters last shorter innings, it is more than made up by the fact that England score a lot more (4.77 an over in comparison to 3.1) with the balls available. The net effect has been a dramatic increase in batter averages, from 30 runs per wicket to a decimal under 40. This figure in itself is high in comparison to recent, and distance, test match wicket averages.
Taking this a little further, general test match stats say that a batsman gets out to roughly every 11 false shots. Since Bazball was implemented, England's false shot ratio is 1 x 4,5 balls. Which puts it about perfect on the general test ratio. While England make more frequent false shots using bazball, they still get away with an average amount of false shots per wicket. Which further provides evidential proof that the approach of cashing in while you can is statistically sound. To note, the England false shot ratio is higher in this Ashes (5.0 balls per shot), and not too distinct from Australia's (6.1 balls), despite the gulf in scoring rates. In fact, one could argue based on these statistics, its a noticeable drop in false shots produced by England's bowlers which really stands out this series (across Bazball era, its been 5.0 generally, which also includes the flat pitches of Pakistan which were much, much higher). There is an interesting case then that while false shot ratios are a little higher, and England's batters bat less balls, the scoring rate pays off on both accounts for an extra 100 runs per innings.
Of course, we will never know whether this approach is a consequence of improving one team over a generically good tactic that works for all teams, until a better base batting side attempts it. For instance, would Steve Smith increasing his RR at the cost of innings length work? We simply don't know until someone does it, so we have some data. But if false shots show anything, it does seem to indicate a statistical pay off in general in the data for England.
The only problem with this optimalisation of approach for England is, playing always "optimally" can in itself become somewhat of a negative. In the game of poker for instance, game theorists nowadays posit that playing the "perfect" mathematical strategy for success is counter intuitive, because it becomes predictable, and your opponent will adapt their own behaviour and strategies to counter it. In this case, if you only bet on hands where you are always mathematically likely to win, your opponent will not engage, or can read your play easily, rendering the strategy null and easy to exploit/counter. The "perfect" strategy is therefore one that is dependant on being inefficient or counter-productive a certain percentage of the time. This ensures that your opponent reacts to your imperfections, and sets them up to be exploited by your primary strategy.
In this way, we can see the failures of the bazball style. Australia have reacted to England's optimal strategy by defending solely for that, and giving other opportunities to exploit - one's that England have declined to take in their pursuit of their primary goals. In the last test, had England adapted their style back to one that is defensive, one that has generally been "imperfect" for them, it would have still nevertheless have been a sound idea. When the fielding team puts 4 men on the boundary and bowls in areas where you can only score by taking on those fielders, the element of risk is very high. The ability to adapt to less optimal strategies does, however, mean that switching your play back can exploit the reactions in the field. If England had defended and looked for singles, the Australian captain would start to bring the field in to save the bleeding runs, and at that point the primary strategy to target big hitting once again becomes useful.
In fact, at this point, England have Australia in a position of slight fear of Bazball. Cummins has set his fields abnormally defensively even with the new ball, which in turn sets England for easy runs if they have them, and leaves less catchers for the error. The ability to resort to Bazball at any stage plays on the psyche of the opponents, and is in itself a very powerful tool tactically. If they played to the situation more, they then also boost the likelihood that their primary tactics work. After 10-20 overs of nicking singles from a field spread on the boundary, any captain has to either react, or let the opposition have easy runs. At the point England have won a mini-battle, and should realise that. Any situation they find the opponent with 7 men on the boundary and singles for free on offer, is surely a situation they would accept happily? The main problem is, England haven't taken those opportunities with any length of time.
The Australian reaction is in many ways a tactical blunder, but one that has worked because England have been dogmatic in their pursuit of their playing style. Common sense says, if they deviate from it and adapt, they could have teams on the run. Imagine a scenario as captain where you bring the field up and get smashed, put it back and a team just knocks you for 4 singles an over into gaps? England have the ability to do the former, and should have the ability to do the later.
I would like to think Bazball is a work in progress, and that these errors will eventually be straightened out, with England finding further improvements in efficiency. In many ways, losing 2 tests might be useful in the long run in achieving that aim. There has been a slight god complex about England in their recent era of success, and a feeling of invincibility in the way they play. But the plan could work even better if they try to perfect it.